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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BRYAN JAY STEPHENS, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
l 
)_ 
l 
l 
l 
l 
l 
l 
l 
vs. 
SAFEw.AY STORES, INC., et al., 
Defendants-Respondents. Case No. 16203 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is an appeal by plaintiff Stephens from an 
Order of Dismissal With Prejudice for Failure to Prosecute 
pursuant to Rule 41 Cbl of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute 
was heard before the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, Judqe, of the 
Third Judicial District of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
on the 17th day of November, 1978. The court considered 
defendants' motion based on the file and record in the 
case, affidavits of the parties, memoranda of law, and oral 
argument. The court granted defendants' Motion for Dismissal 
for Failure to Prosecute and entered its Order of Dismissal 
With Prejudice on November 24, 1978. 
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RELIEF SOUGH.T ON APPEAL 
Appellant Stephens seeks reversal of the judgment of 
the lower court and an order remanding the case to the 
T.hird Judicial District Court for trial on the merits, while 
~espondent seeks to have the lower court's Dismissal With 
Prejudice affirmed. I 
STATEMENT OF FACTS I 
On the 2.5th day of June, 1971, an incident occurred at a! 
I 
safeway Store located at 1690 South Ninth East, out of which I 
I 
plaintiff's allegations spring. Plaintiff served its complaint! 
on defendants on July 2.8, 1971, in Case No. 200474, alleginq 
claims in assault and battery, false arrest and false 
imprisonment and alleging $200.00 in medical bills as 
special damages. (R. 181 Defendants proceeded with discovery 
by taking plaintiff's deposition and interviewing thirteen 
witnesses to the incident. (R. 331 Trial was set for the 
13th day of June, 1972. (R. 33} By the 12th of June, 1972, 
defendants had subpoenaed five witnesses to appear at trial, 
had contacted another eight witnesses to suggest that they 
may be used at trial, had prepared proposed jury instructions 
and were, in all respects, prepared for trial. (R.33l On 
the 12th day of June, 1972, the day before trial, plaintiff's 
counsel submitted to the court a Hotion and Order for Dismissa 
Without Prejudice. Contrary to Appellant's assertion in 
' f F ts there is no indication that Appellant s Statement o ac , 
-2-
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either the Motion or the Order was stipulated to 
counsel. Plaintiff's motion was ~ranted. 
Six months later on the 13th of November, 1!72, plaiDtiff 
again served an essentially identical complaint on defeDdaata 
statin~ the same causes of action and a~ain allegin~ $200.00 in 
medical bills as special dama~es. (R. 3} On the 4th of 
December, 1972, defendants submitted their Answer aa4 Pirst &et 
of Interro~atories.(R. 5-101 Nine days later, defendants 
received a notice that plaintiff had dischar~ed his attorney, 
Richard M. Day. After ~ivin~ plaintiff two months to 
answer defendants' Interro~atories, defendants filed a Motion 
to Compel Answers to Interro~atories on February 5, 1973. 
(R. 14,15) On the 15th of February, 1973, the court heard 
defendants' Motion to Compel and ordered plaintiff to answer 
within ten days. tR. 171 On February 20, 1973, plaintiff 
filed his Answers to Defendants' Interro~atories admittin~ 
that to date the only doctor which he had seen since 
June of 1971 was dentist Richard D. Christiansen and that 
his medical bills to that date were $200.00, the entire amount 
of which was paid to Dr. Christiansen. (R. lSl On June 28, 
1973, John D. Russell filed his appearance as counsel. In the 
intervening five and one-half years, between Mr. Russell's 
and defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to appearance 
Prosecute, the record reflects no discovery efforts on the 
f t for trial setting; no part of the plaintif ; no reques 
-3-
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supplemental answers to interrogatories; no substitution of 
John Doe defendant; and no attempt to settle tte case. 
On the first C..ay of November, 1978, defendants prepared 
and filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute, mail-
in~ the appropriate copy to counsel. (B. 24-251 On or about 
the 14th day of Noyemtler, 197 8, plaintiff served on defendants, 
Plaintiff's Menora.ndum of La"r Opposing Motion to Dismiss. 
(R, 26-29l On the 16th of November, 1978, defendants submitted 
an affidavit in support of their motion and the motion was 
heard and granted on the lith day of November, 1978. Judgment 
was entered on the 24th of November, 1978. 
ARGmtENT 
POINT I 
THE RULING ON A 41 (b) MOTION IS PLACED IN 
THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT 
AND WILL NOT BE 0'.TERTURNED UNLESS IT IS 
SHmiN THAT THE COURT BELO~i ABUSED IT'S 
DISCRETION. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 410::) provides in 
part as follO\-iS: 
"For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute 
or to ccnply with ~ese rules or any order of 
the court, a defendant may move for d.:.smissal 
of an action or any cl-aim. against him .•. " 
This court in ~axfield vs. Fishler, 538 P.2d 1.323 U975l 
ob ser\·ed that: 
If Rule 41 (bl, Utah Rules of Civil Procedur~ 
is to be effective in e~:pediting and resolvlnc:r 
-4-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
·~ 
' 
litigation, it must require litigants to prose-
cute their claims with due diligence or expect 
the penalty of dismissal. ' 
The trial court in Utah has been given the responsibility 
of determining what is and what is not diligent prosecution of 
a claim. In Westinghouse Electric Supply Company vs. Paul w. 
Larson Contractors, Inc., 544 P.2nd 876 (1977} the Utah 
Supreme Court recognized the discretion of the District Court 
in making this decision. 
It is not to be doubted that in order to handle 
the business of the court with efficiency and 
expedition, the trial court should have a reason-
able !attitude of discretion in dismissing for 
failure to prosecute if a party fails to move 
forward according to the rules and directions 
of the court without justifiable excuse. 
lemphasis added} 
On appeal the highest court of this state will give considerable 
deference to the discretion of the lower court. Thompson 
Ditch Company vs. Jackson 29 Utah 2d 259, 508 P.2d 528 (1973}: 
"The ruling of the court will not be disturbed 
on appeal unless the record plainly shows that 
the court below abused it's discretion." 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF PROVIDED NO JUSTIFICATION OR 
EXCUSE FOR NOT BRINGING HIS CAUSE OF 
ACTION TO TRIAL WITHIN SEVEN AND ONE-HALF 
YEARS OF FILING HIS ACTION. THE TRIAL 
COURT'S DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE WAS PROPER. 
The trial court in making its ruling in the present 
d b rve the following: case had the opportunity to consider an o se 
-5-
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UNUSUAL DELAY 
In the Westinghouse Case, cited above, just under three 
years elapsed between the filing of the original complaint 
and the filing of the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to 
Prosecute. This court considered the passage of that amount 
of time to be "unusual delay". supra Page 879 • 
. The delay between filing Stephens original case and 
Dismissal For Failure to Prosecute, is approximately 
tNc and one-half times that apparent in the Westinghouse 
case. Ironically, the Maxfield case (.1975}, relied on by re· 
spondent, and the Westinghouse U977l, Utah Oil (19771, 
Polk (1977) and Johnson U977) Cases, relied on by appellant, 
involve original claims which were filed, Dismissed for 
Failure to Prosecute, appealed and resolved in the Utah Supr~ 
Court all during pendency of the instant case. Indeed, the 
plaintiffs in the Utah Oil and Polk Cases did not file their 
original actions until 1974, many months after the plaintiff's 
last action of record in this case. 
In the case of Maxfield vs. Fishler, supra, the 
Supreme Court upheld a dismissal of an action where plaintifi 
was not prepared for trial two years after filing the 
complaint, had not filed the required bond, and had made no 
discovery. Except for the bond requirement noted in that 
case plaintiff here equals or surpasses the dilatory actions 
-6-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the plaintiff Maxfield. The Supreme Court in Brasber 
Motor and Finance Co. vs. Brown, 23 Utah 2d 247, 461 P.2d 
464 (.1969), upheld the trial court•s dismissal of an action 
where the case had been pending for 5 1/2 years without 
significant action by plaintiff. Mr. Stephens has burdeaed 
the defendants in the instant case with this suit for 1 
years, and has taken no affirmative action for over 6 1/2 
years, except to answer interrogatories, and to notice the 
appearance of counsel. 
It cannot be denied that the delay, apparent in this 
case, is extreme, giving the court below a right to require 
plaintiff to show excuse or justification of a comparable 
magnitude. Yet the plaintiff has provided the court with no 
significant excuse. 
EXCUSE FOR DELAY 
Plaintiff in Appellant's Brief asserts; 
"that any delay has not been unreasonable, 
in view of the fact that this action involves 
claim for personal injuries, and respectfully 
points out that there has been activity in seeking 
out competent medical examination and tre~tment 
for plaintiff's injury." (Appellant's Br1ef, 
Page 6~ 
This assertion tracks word for word plaintiff's argument 
in his Memorandum of Law opposing Respondent's Motion to 
Dismiss. lR. 281 
Though plaintiff "points out" to the court that he has 
been actively seeking out medical examination and treatment, 
-7-
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Plaintiff, at the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss produced 
no Affidavit, information, bill or any other evidence of 
medical treatment, examination or activity of any sort. The 
court below had counsel's bare assertion that additional 
medical examination and treatment was being sought. The 
record indicates otherwise. On July 28, 1971, plaintiff's 
original Complaint, as served, alleged $200.00 in medical 
bills incurred as medical damages. Sixteen months later on 
the lJth of November, 1972, plaintiff's second Complaint 
alleged the same $200.00 in medical bills as special damages. 
On February 20, 1973, in plaintiff's Answers to Defendant's 
Interrogatories, plaintiff under oath still claimed only 
$200.00 in medical bills, and special damages, attributing 
the entire bill to Richard D. Christiansen, D.D.S. 
The record shows that plaintiff within a month of the 
incident, on the 25th of June, 1971, sought only the medical 
help of a dentist and incurred dentist's bills of $200.00. 
In the nearly 19 months thereafter, plaintiff neither sought 
nor obtained any additional medical help, of any kind. 
Plaintiff provided no indication or proof of any specific 
measures whatsoever to seek additional medical examination, 
or treatment. The court below cannot be faulted for finding 
plaintiff's excuse for delay less than compelling. 
-8-
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ACTICNS BY 'l'BE PARTIES 
The record is clear that defendants ha,• done everyttinq 
required of tt.em to prepare to defend against plaintift•s 
clailr.s. Defendants ha,•e been completely prepared for trial 
once, ha,•ing taken the deposition of the plaintiff and 
having interviewed witnesses to the incident. On the other 
hand, the recore is equally clear that the plaintiff has 
done nothinq on this case since June of 1973. The record 
is totally devoid of evidence of prosecution of the case 
on the part of the plaintiff. 
INUURY TO PART:rES 
Plaintiff in Appellant's Brief makes the following 
statement: 
"It is fundamental to our svstem of justice 
that an injured plaintiff be given his day 
in court, and that he should net be, in effect 
defaulted, for technical procedural reasons." 
Appellant's Brief, (page 51 
Plaintiff is forcetting that he han his opportunity for 
his day in court, and on the courthouse steps had second 
thoughts, and arranqed dismissal o~ his ~~n case. Thereafter, 
the plaintiff refiled the case, and sat on his claim for six 
and one-half years. Dismissal of Plaintiff's action can 
hardly be characterized as based en a technical procedural 
point. True enough, t~e court below dism~ssed plaintiff's 
claim on a procedural rule, but plaintiff's egregious inaction 
in the case is, on the equities, an abandonment o: his claim-
-9-
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Plaintiff pushed defendants into a lawsuit, required them 
to .spend considerable amounts of time and money in preparation 
to defend the lawsuit, on the eve of the scheduled trial, 
dismissed the suit, and then six months later resurrected 
tba same suit, dragging the defendants back into court. 
Defendants have had this lawsuit hanging over their heads now 
fbr nearly eight years with an alleced $1S~,no~.oo 
at risk. In addition, witnesses memories have faded and so~ 
witnesses may no longer be available. The impact of eight 
years of delay upon defendants cannot be said to be insub-
stantial. 
CONCLUSION 
The present case constitutes a classic example of a 
nuisance suit being brought against a deep pocket for the 
purpose of squeezing a few dollars out of a defendant by 
simply keeping the case alive and a thorn in a defendants' 
side with no real intent to bring the case to trial and with 
no real interest in the merits of the case. This action 
represents precisely the type of case with which Rule 4l(b) 
was promulgated to deal. 
The defendants in this case have done everything in thei: 
power to proceed, short of forcing the case to trial by reques: 
a trial setting. Plaintiffs have done nothing but sit on 
their claim and resist defendant's discovery efforts. It is 
the plaintiff who chose when and where to burden defendants 
with a legal action. With that perogative came the responsi:-
-10-
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to proceed with the case, in good faith, aDd with 4ua 
. 
diligence. To rule in plaintiff's favor in this case ...W·r·; · ',;. 
remove that responsibility from the shoulders of pla1at:I.M •.. ~' · 
SUch a ruling would have unfortunate consequences on tba 
already log jammed court calendar by fostering the exiataDoa 
of dead wood in the system. The court must allow tM a.ut:s'~ 
courts to prune from their files those cases which aze loag 
dead. The lower court's Dismissal, With Prejudice, in thi• 
case should be affirm~ 
DATED this ~ay of May, 1979. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the 
Respondent's Brief have been sent to Appellant, by placing said 
'd · th u s Mail, and addressed to 
copies, postage prepa~ , ~n e • • 
John o. Russell, attorney, 430 Judge Bu~ding, 8 East Broadway, 
',~ 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, this t.r day of May, 1979 • 
p_;:/. 
'-<:;:>. ~ 
/ 
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